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The Problem of Trust 
 
 
1.!   
Trust, I propose, should be distinguished from mere reliance, even if it 
essentially involves reliance.1 Here are some examples of trust. Leaving oneÕs 
closed diary on a desk where one knows oneÕs partner will see it. Not asking 
for a second quote when a mechanic says oneÕs car needs lots of work. Shaking 
on a deal. Following a strangerÕs directions. Purchasing a good that will be 
delivered later. And these are also examples of reliance. The difference is that 
although reliance can be willing Ð one can be confident that someone or thing 
will prove reliable Ð it can also be forced. By contrast, trust, Bernard Williams 
observes, Òinvolves the willingness of one party to rely on another to act in 
certain waysÓ (2002, 88). This willingness is essential because to trust someone 
is to take an optimistic view of that person and their motivations. It is Òto 
lower oneÕs guard, to refrain from taking precautions against an interaction 
partner, even when the other, because of opportunism or incompetence, could 
act in a way that might seem to justify precautionsÓ (Elster 2007, 344). Such 
precautions might include keeping oneÕs diary in a locked desk, and 
consolidating the handshake with a legally enforceable contract. To trust is to 
forgo precaution and garner reassurance just from the thought that the other 
is trustworthy.  
The attitude of trust is then part identified by this thought. We can 
ÔtrustÕ, or so we say, our car to start or our alarm to go off. But cars and alarms 
arenÕt trustworthy and we donÕt, properly speaking, trust them. Rather, this is 
just reliance: we rely on them and do so believing that they are, or will prove, 
reliable. Reliability is a feature of trustworthiness but does not equate to it. 
Similarly, and famously, KantÕs neighbours could rely on his punctuality in 
the same way that they could rely on a clock; they could ÔtrustÕ Kant to walk by 
the window at eight in the morning. But trusting Kant to do this, Russell 
Hardin argues, would require his Òhaving their interests at heart in deciding 
to take his walkÓ (2002, 5). It would require thinking of KantÕs walk as a 
trustworthy action, or one done, at least in part, in response to the 
dependence exhibited by his neighbourÕs ÔtrustÕ. But of course Kant did not 
take his walk for this reason and his neighbourÕs did not think he did. There 
might have been reliance and reliability but there was no trust or 
trustworthiness. 
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Trustworthiness is more than reliability in that it is evaluative as well 
as descriptive. The trustworthy act, like the opportunist one, is done in 
response to someoneÕs depending on one in certain ways, but unlike the 
opportunist act, it is the appropriate thing to do Ð where ÔappropriateÕ here 
amounts to a quasi-moral evaluation. Thus, we think, you shouldnÕt read 
anotherÕs private diary or give an inflated quote, and you should honour 
agreements and help strangers who ask for directions. The thought that the 
person one interacts with is trustworthy, or will prove so, then provides 
rational reassurance: there is no need for precaution, if this thought is true. 
So trust is unproblematic if one knows that the trusted is trustworthy. 
But, arguably, it becomes problematic as our epistemic grounds for judging 
that the trusted is trustworthy lessen. However, the resulting problem of trust 
is fundamentally practical rather than epistemic: it is a problem of the 
rationality of reliance broadly Ð a problem of the rationality of cooperation. 
Interactions that potentially raise the issue are those that have a worst 
outcome: one delivers and the other defaults. One leaves oneÕs diary on the 
desk and it gets read, one doesnÕt get a second quote and is stung, and so on. 
So precautions can seem justifiable. And what one seeks to do in taking 
precaution is to remove the problematic reliance. But if the reliance cannot be 
removed, what would make it rational are any grounds that provide 
reassurance that the other is, or would prove, reliable or cooperative? Of 
course, knowledge that the person is trustworthy would do this, but reliance 
could be rationally sustained on slighter grounds. In respect of this, Williams 
(1988, 118) identifies four general motivations people can have to cooperate or 
rely on one another. Fear of sanctions is one; the others are: particular self-
interest, a positive evaluation of cooperation and a positive evaluation of 
friendly relations. Sanctions can be informal or formal. Informal sanctions 
consist in some form of social exclusion, such as loss of reputation or simple 
ostracism, and the further losses this causes. Formal sanctions can be 
anything from a fine to a prison sentence; professionals who fail in their role, 
for instance, can lose their legal right to practice.2 We are sensitive to all these 
motivating reasons for cooperation. Moreover, we also engage with one 
another in ways that provide some grounds for empirical judgment of 
motivation. Certain features of an individual or their behavior provide what 
Elster (2007, 347) respectively calls ÔsignsÕ or ÔsignalsÕ that allow a judgment of 
reliability. The problem of trust is then this: even if the net is cast widely, so 
that all that is needed to rationalize reliance is some grounds for judging 
reliability, we can still lack grounds for this judgement.  
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2.!   
This problem can be outlined by reference to an experiment called The Trust 
Game.3 In this game there are two players: a trusting party or ÔinvestorÕ, X and 
a trusted party or ÔtrusteeÕ, Y. In the simplest version X has a certain 
endowment, say £100, and option of keeping this or transferring part or all of 
it to Y and keeping whatever remains. What gets transferred gets multiplied, 
say by a factor of 4, and Y then has the option of keeping the resulting sum or 
making a back-transfer of part or all of it and keeping the remainder. In this 
case, the best X could do, would be to give Y everything and hope Y splits his 
£400 windfall. If Y does share, both do well and the game has resulted in a 
cooperative outcome. But how would it be in YÕs interest to return anything?  
One way in which it might be is if the game were iterated. In such a 
situation, defection would be repaid by a lack of future cooperation, and one 
would thereby lose the benefits of this cooperation. So XÕs interest in 
receiving a back-transfer is also in YÕs interest since it allows for another 
exchange. And this, Russell Hardin proposes, is all that trust amounts to: it is 
merely a matter of encapsulated interest.4 The problem with this view is that 
XÕs interests can be encapsulated in YÕs interests only insofar as the exchange 
is on-going. If the relationship is one-off, then there is no value to be got from 
acting as if it were on-going.5 But then considering such cases, why think that 
Y will cooperate? And here we return to the motivations that people can have 
to be cooperative, or to rely on one another, and our knowledge of these. 
However, suppose now that XÕs position is one of ignorance; that is, suppose Ð 
as is meant to be the case in the experimental set up Ð that X knows nothing 
about Y and so is ignorant of what does or might move Y. Once this 
assumption of ignorance is added it becomes hard to see how anything other 
than defection from the start could be the rational thing to do. Admittedly, we 
are never entirely ignorant Ð even to presume that Y prefers more money to 
less is a presumption about preference. However, once the rationality of 
reliance is grounded on the judgement that the other party will prove reliable, 
then it seems as though reliance becomes irrational when the grounds for 
such a judgement are not available. In the face of ignorance, it is surely better 
to keep what monies one has.  
This problem of trust is then a sceptical problem insofar as the facts that 
generate it commonly hold true; that is, insofar as (i) we need to rely on 
another but recognize that doing so could have a worst outcome Ð we rely and 
other proves unreliable Ð and (ii) we know that this interaction is one-off (or 
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one of determinate number), and (iii) we are entirely ignorant of the otherÕs 
individual motivations, but recognize a general motivation to be unreliable. 
Given these facts, reliance would seem to be irrational, and if it is, then 
afortiori so too is trust. Yet presently, and thankfully, trust is part of the 
fabric of our society: thus a key experimental result is that people, with some 
interesting qualifications, do by and large cooperate in the Trust Game even 
though it is played as a one-off game under conditions of ignorance, and hold 
trustees to the expectation that they ought to cooperate in return.6 Thus, as 
with other sceptical problems, the issue is how to reconcile the philosophical 
result that reliance seems frequently irrational with the everyday fact that 
trust is pervasive. The difficult question is to account for how such reliance is 
rational under these conditions. 
 
3.!   
In practice, it is simple to render reliance unproblematic: any potentially 
problematic situation, one described by (i), can be altered such that facts (ii) 
and (iii) no longer hold of it; that is, devices can be introduced which through 
adding future interactions or some other means, such as sanctions, give the 
trustee known reason to be cooperative. But, David Gauthier observes, to 
solve the problem of trust in this way is simply to Òmiss the pointÓ: what is 
needed is an account of how the mere Òmutual advantageousnessÓ of 
cooperation, the fact that both investor and trustee benefit from it, renders it 
rational. Thus Gauthier distinguishes, what might be called, internal and 
external solutions. An external solution establishes the rationality of reliance, 
in a situation where (i) is true by falsifying (ii) or (iii). An internal solution 
shows how reliance is rational even given the truth of (i), (ii) and (iii). And he 
seeks to provide an internal solution. 
The solution, Gauthier suggests, is to abandon the conception of 
rationality presupposed in generating the problem of trust. What is 
presupposed is a maximising conception of rationality: individuals pursue 
what is most in their interest. So where (i), (ii) and (iii) hold, and the investor 
is ignorant of the trusteeÕs particular interests, he can only think that the 
trustee would keep all the monies if he had the chance. However, rather than 
see the rational outcome as an equilibrium point Ð the product of maximising 
choices Ð the rational outcome, Gauthier (2013, 195-6), proposes, is the optimal 
one, or that outcome that could not be better for one subject without being 
worse for others. The rational thing to do is to adopt a strategy that optimizes 
rather than maximizes, where to do this is to be what Gauthier (1986, 167) calls 
a Ôconstrained maximizerÕ as opposed to a Ôstraight-forward maximizerÕ. A 
constrained maximizer pays attention to the interests of others, not merely 
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their choices, or at least does so conditional on others reasoning likewise. And 
it is rational, Gauthier argues, to be a constrained maximizer because one 
does best this way. The reason for this is simple: we have a basic disposition to 
cooperate only on terms that are fair and, as such, constrained maximizers 
have more opportunity for cooperation. ÒStraightforward maximizers are 
disposed to take advantage of their fellows should the opportunity arise; 
knowing this, their fellows would prevent such opportunity arisingÓ (Gauthier 
1986, 173). So it is rational for the investor to rely on the trustee to return half 
the windfall and for the trustee to make this fair return because were either to 
have the disposition to act otherwise they would have less opportunity for 
cooperation in general. Any gain to be made in this case would be offset by the 
greater loss that this exclusion would entail. 
Allow that Gauthier has established the rationality of being a 
constrained maximizer. A constrained maximizer will cooperate and so rely 
on another only if the other is equally judged to be constrained maximizer. As 
such the straightforward maximizer Òmust seek to appear trustworthy, an 
upholder of his agreementsÓ (Gauthier 1986, 173). And constrained maximizers 
must cultivate Òtheir ability to distinguish sincere cooperators from insincere 
onesÓ (Gauthier 1986, 181). A difficulty, then, for this solution to the problem of 
trust is that it must presume this constrained maximizer ability outstrips the 
ability of straightforward maximizers to beguile. And this presumption just 
seems to be the denial of (iii): the rationality of reliance thereby hinges on a 
belief about the trusteeÕs motivational dispositions, namely that the trustee is 
a constrained maximizer, not a straightforward one, and recognised as such. 
Thus in a situation of ignorance, were (iii) true, the rational thing to do would 
surely be to presume that the other is a straightforward maximizer and avoid 
relying on them. 
Not necessarily argues Gauthier. The inability to detect straightforward 
maximizers would not matter if there were not so many of them. In 
demonstration of this Gauthier offers a sophisticated account of how the 
rationality of being a constrained maximizer would be preserved if the 
proportion of constrained maximizers in the population were significantly 
large.7 However, the issue then becomes what reason we have for thinking 
that our population is like that. And the problem is that if our reason for 
thinking this is empirical, GauthierÕs argument for the rationality of 
cooperation would seem to rest, at base, on the denial of (iii): our situation is 
not really one of ignorance if we know enough to empirically justify the 
assumption that the other is a constrained maximizer. However, arguably we 
do not have any apriori reason for making this assumption.  
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To argue this, consider the case of Blue Jays and Viceroys.8 Although 
they are good for Blue Jays to eat, Viceroys look like Monarchs that are not. 
This mimicry is an evolutionary lie. The Monarch signals truly that it is a poor 
meal, the Viceroy mimics this signal to communicate something false. The 
position of an investor is then analogous to the position of a Blue Jay faced 
with a brightly colored butterfly. Just as the Blue Jay gains from eating the 
butterfly if it is a Viceroy, and loses if it is a Monarch; so the investor gains 
from making the transfer if the trustee is a constrained maximizer and loses if 
trustee is a straightforward maximizer. And the ability of investors to 
discriminate constrained maximizers from straightforward maximizers, like 
the ability of Blue Jays to discriminate Viceroys from Monarchs, is limited. 
Suppose then a best case starting state: this limited discriminator capacity is 
unproblematic because there is no deception. Only Monarchs are colourful, 
only constrained maximizers purport to be so, Blue Jays eat all drab 
butterflies and the worst case scenario is never realized for the investor. From 
this starting point, deception will evolve: colourful Viceroys and 
straightforward maximizers who learn Òto appear trustworthyÓ, will flourish. 
But as levels of deception rise, levels of reliance go down; but they should 
decrease only so far, because if reliance vanished, there would be no gain to be 
had from deception. So at what point does the population reach a stable 
equilibrium? ÒInterestingly enoughÓ, Eliot Sober (1994, 80) observes, Òit turns 
out that the stability of the system depends on the type of dynamics one 
assumes.Ó What this means is that there is no apriori reason for thinking that  
constrained maximizers predominate. They might, just as most colorful 
butterflies might be Monarchs, but if this is so, this Òstability depends on 
some highly contingent properties of the evolutionary processÓ (Sober 1994, 
80). Which is to say it depends on some highly contingent properties of our 
society. So the rationality of reliance has to be ultimately grounded on an 
empirical belief about our social situation. This might be a solution Ð and in 
some ways it is close to the one I sketch below Ð but so far it is not the internal 
one hoped for. 
 
4.!   
Philip Pettit presents a different internal solution to the problem of trust. 
Take any potential engagement where (i) is true, such as the Trust Game; the 
standard reason that an investor might rely on a trustee to share their 
windfall, Pettit argues, would be the judgement that the trustee is trustworthy 
(where by this Pettit means little more than Ôis reliableÕ). And the standard 
reason one has for this judgement is the further belief that the trustee is 
motivated by loyalty, virtue or prudence, where these motivations need not be 
exclusive. So what grounds are then available for this judgement if the 
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investor is ignorant of the trusteeÕs particular motivations? That is, if facts (ii) 
and (iii) hold. To answer this question, Pettit (2002, 353) suggests that one 
needs to recognise that people are motivated by both Òaction dependent 
goodsÓ, such things as commodities and money, and Òattitude dependent 
goodsÓ or such things as Òbeing loved, being liked, being acknowledged, being 
respected, being admired, and so on.Ó Moreover, the desire for these goods is 
universal in that it can be assumed Òthat each of us desires the good opinion 
of othersÓ Pettit (2002, 354). However, if this is the case, there are grounds for 
thinking that the trustee will prove reliable, and so grounds for rationally 
relying on the trustee, even given the truth of (i), (ii) and (iii). 
Pettit lays out these grounds with the following argument. 
1. There are situations where an act of trust will signal to a trustee, and 
to witnesses, that the trustor believes in or presumes on the 
trustworthiness of the trustee É and so thinks well of him to that 
extent. 
2. The trustee is likely to have a desire, intrinsic or instrumental, for 
the good opinion of the trustor and of witnesses to the act of trust. 
3. The desire for that good opinion will tend to give the trustee reason 
to act in the way in which the trustor relies on him to act. 
Conclusion. And so the trustor, recognizing these facts may have a 
reason to trust someone, even when he actually has no reason to 
believe in the otherÕs pre-existing trustworthiness (Pettit 2002, 357). 
As a statement of a reason we can have for relying on others, this conclusion 
is well observed. But as a solution to the problem of trust, the argument faces 
a couple of difficulties. First, to resolve the problem of trust, the desire for the 
good opinion of others needs to be universal in the sense that it can be taken 
to be a component in every interaction. Thus, premise 2 is too weak as stated 
with the qualifier Ôlikely to have a desireÕ and the conclusion correspondingly 
so with the qualifier Ômay have a reasonÕ. To strengthen premise 2, it would 
have to supposed that the desire for the good opinion of others were intrinsic 
rather than instrumental, since it would not be plausible to claim either that 
the good opinion of others was instrumentally valuable in every case, or that 
it was instrumentally valuable in every case where the trustor didnÕt have an 
intrinsic care for the good opinion of the trustee. Suppose then that this is 
true: in every case the trustee will have an intrinsic desire for the good 
opinion of the trustor and of witnesses to the act of trust. Even with premise 2 
thus strengthened, it is still insufficient for the trustor to have a reason to 
trust Ð that is, rely Ð in the moot cases. The issue now is that even if the 
trustee always has a desire for the good opinion of others, and so a reason to 
be ÔtrustworthyÕ, this reason need not suffice for being so. This is because in 
most cases the trustee will have more interests than this at play in the 
8 
interaction. So what needs also to be true is that the trustor has grounds for 
thinking that this desire for good opinion of others is either the only 
operative desire or the dominant one. And while the trustor could well have 
grounds for thinking this, the trustor would not have such grounds when the 
interaction takes places under conditions of ignorance; that is, when (iii) is 
true. Put another way, if (iii) is true, the trustor lacks the unique reason for 
relying on the trustee that Pettit hypothesizes. So the hypothesis of this 
reason offers no internal solution to the problem of trust. Again it depends on 
particular empirical belief whose possession implies that one of the facts 
generating the problem does not hold. 
 
5.!   
In the remains of this paper, I hope to elaborate on a solution to the problem 
of trust suggested by Bernard Williams. In this section, I outline this solution. 
As observed, Williams (2002, 88) takes trust Òin its most basic senseÓ to 
be no more than Òthe willingness of one party to rely on another to act in 
certain waysÓ This willingness implies some expectation of motive but Òit does 
not imply that those motives have to be of some specific kindÓ (Williams 2002, 
88). In particular, it does not imply that the motives of the trusted are those of 
the trustworthy person: the judgement that the trusted was sensitive to the 
possibility of punitive sanctions, for instance, might suffice for the prediction 
that the trusted would prove reliable, and so rationalize reliance. However, 
Williams goes on to argue, such judgements of motive do not resolve what IÕve 
called the problem of trust. WilliamsÕs interest in this problem lies with a 
particular instantiation of it: what motives we have for telling others the 
truth, or being sincere. Any functioning society will involve cooperative 
engagements which demand information be communicated between 
individuals. So sincerity is clearly desirable from the social point of view, but 
it is equally not always in an individualÕs best interest. For instance Williams 
imagines the case of the hunter who has just made a kill, which he would 
prefer to keep for himself and his family. Sincerity is not in this hunterÕs 
interest. The problem this case illustrates is that: 
The value that attaches to any given personÕs having this disposition 
[Sincerity] seems, so far as we have gone, largely a value for other 
people. It may obviously be useful for an individual to have the 
benefits of other peopleÕs correct information, and not useful to him 
that they should benefit of his. So this is a classic example of the Òfree-
riderÓ situation (Williams 2002, 58). 
Whilst it is always in an audienceÕs interest to be informed, sincerity need not 
best serve a speakerÕs interest and as audiences we know that this is the case. 
So, what I have called, the problem of trust threatens. The source of this 
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problem, Williams argues, is that sincerity Ð trustworthiness in speech Ð has 
only been given instrumental value: its value is given by that good which 
follows from information being pooled, such as the good brought about by 
cooperative endeavor. And when it is only valued in this way there will always 
be the possibility of a fissure between interacting partiesÕ interests such that 
trust exposes the trusting, or those who have a trustworthy disposition, to 
Ôfree-ridersÕ. An adequate solution must not allow the realization of this 
possibility to be systemic. What this shows, Williams (2002, 59) claims, is 
Òthat no society can get by É with a purely instrumental conception of the 
values of truthÓ of which sincerity, which is trustworthiness in speech, is one. 
What any society thereby requires is that such trustworthines be intrinsically 
valued, so that it is thought to be Òa good thing (many other things being 
equal) to act as a trustworthy person acts, just because that is the kind of 
action it isÓ (Williams 2002, 90). 
Three points need to be made about this idea of intrinsic value. First, to 
value trusting and trustworthy acts intrinsically is to take an evaluative 
stance: it is a good thing to act as the trusting and trustworthy person acts, 
which is to say that one ought to act this way. So if solving the problem of 
trust requires thinking of trust in this way, trust must be taken to involve 
more than mere reliance Ð as claimed in section 1. Second, it follows, and 
Williams stresses this implication, that there can be no solution to the 
problem of trust that starts, as GauthierÕs and PettitÕs do, from an individualÕs 
interests. This is because no argument from such a starting point, namely one 
Òwhich sets out from a game-theoretical formulation of the problems of trust 
could possibly show that trustworthiness had an intrinsic valueÓ (Williams 
2002, 90). The most that could be concluded is that it can be in oneÕs interest 
to act as if trust and trustworthiness had intrinsic value; but this is consistent 
with pretending they had this value, rather than valuing them, and so would 
not eliminate the issue of free-riders or solve the problem. However, third, 
talk of intrinsic value raises a dilemma. On the one hand, intrinsic value 
seems rather mysterious, amounting to the claim that Òthere is nothing else to 
be said about its [trustÕs] valuableness Ð it is good because it is good, and that 
is all there is to be said about itÓ (Williams 2002, 90). On the other, if some 
account of its value is offered Òsuch as securing cooperative activity which is 
in everyoneÕs interestÓ (Williams 2002, 90) then it seems as though one is 
giving a reductive account: its value is instrumental after all. 
What is needed is a non-reductive explanation of what it is for 
something to have intrinsic value. And a sufficient condition for this, 
Williams proposes, is that 
first, it is necessary (or nearly necessary) for basic human purposes 
and needs that human beings should treat it as an intrinsic good; and, 
second they can coherently treat it as an intrinsic good (Williams 2002, 
92). 
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A genealogy, he then claims, satisfies both of these conditions. Sincerity is 
Ônecessary (or nearly necessary) for basic human purposesÕ in that were 
individuals not to have the disposition to be sincere, or trustworthy in speech, 
no cooperative endeavour would be possible and there would be no such thing 
as society, at least as we know it. Except this claim is too strong as stated: 
cooperation in communication could be established on the same grounds as 
cooperation more generally: through knowledge of the motivations we know 
people can have to cooperate. But what could be claimed is that it is only 
through individuals having the disposition to be trustworthy that 
cooperation could be sustainable once conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are in place. 
So trustworthinessÕs having intrinsic value is necessary for what I called an 
internal solution to the problem of trust. And a genealogy then shows how 
sincerity Ôcan coherently be treated as an intrinsic goodÕ through showing how 
our having the disposition to be trustworthy Òmakes sense to [us] from the 
inside, so to speakÓ (Williams 2002, 92). And this is what I hope to do in the 
remains of this paper: to offer a conceptual analysis of trust and 
trustworthiness Ð an account of our understanding of these notions Ð that 
makes sense of our being motivated to act in trusting and trustworthy ways 
just because we value acting in these ways, where this motivation can be 
undimmed by an interaction occurring under conditions (i), (ii) and (iii). 
However, before continuing with this analysis, it is worth observing 
that the kind of generalised disposition to trust and be trustworthy, which 
follows our intrinsically valuing trust and trustworthiness, is quite different 
to the dispositions to ÔtrustÕ and be ÔtrustworthyÕ as characterised by Gauthier 
and Pettit. The rational disposition to have, or strategy to follow, according to 
Gauthier is to be a constrained maximizer when and only when one judges 
oneÕs interaction partner is so and to be a straightforward maximizer 
otherwise. To be a straightforward maximizer would be to be untrustworthy; 
it would demonstrate a failure to give the appropriate deliberative weight to a 
trusting partyÕs interests. Thus, GauthierÕs proposal suggests that one can be 
motivated to be trustworthy in some situations and motivated to be 
untrustworthy in others, which implies that the disposition to be trustworthy 
can be switched on and off in response to the situation one finds oneself in.9 
However, it is not plausible to suppose that a generalized disposition to trust 
or be trustworthy can be conditional in this way. Take the Trust Game. Were 
an investor to have a generalized disposition to trust, the investor would be 
disposed to make a transfer irrespective of any judgement of the trusteeÕs 
likely response. To simply keep the money would seem the ÔwrongÕ thing to do. 
Of course, this is not say that there is no knowledge that would stop the 
investor from making a transfer, but it is to suggest that the disposition to do 
so cannot be conditional in the way Gauthier describes. Rather, in having this 
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disposition the investor would see himself as having a reason to make a 
transfer, a reason that in some circumstances might be unfortunately 
outweighed, but a reason irrespective of these circumstances not a reason that 
only exists conditional upon them. 
Sticking with the Trust Game, the rationalisation of trust proposed by 
Pettit (in the strengthened form suggested) proceeds from the premise that we 
have a basic desire for the good opinion of others. While this may be true, 
both of the trustee and in general, the trustworthy response to the investorÕs 
transfer does not start deliberation from the fact that a return transfer will 
receive plaudits. Rather, the trustworthy person starts deliberation from the 
fact that the investor trusted or made a transfer, and is consequently in a 
position of vulnerability. And were the investor to have a generalised 
disposition to trust, this disposition would, in part, be that of presuming the 
trustee would start deliberation from this fact. To think otherwise, and, in 
particular, to suppose that the trustee deliberates from the premise that a 
return transfer would garner praise would be to think badly of the trustee; it 
would be to think that their motivations are not ÔrightÕ, or not those of the 
trustworthy person.10  
 
6.!   
The challenge, as Williams puts it, is to give an Òexplanation without 
reductionÓ; to say why trust and trustworthiness are valued without making 
this value instrumental. This challenge, I now want to suggest, cannot be met 
all the while trust is thought of as a three-place predicate whose instances are 
X trusting Y to φ. While trust can be three-place, we trust one another to act in 
various ways Ð not to read our diary, to give a fair quote and so on Ð this form 
of trust, its contractual form one might call it, cannot be fundamental; or at 
least it cannot be so, if trust is something that is intrinsically valued. For the 
value, for X, in trusting Y to φ is fundamentally the (action dependent) goods 
that come from Y φ-ing. Its value is fundamentally instrumental (the value 
attached to keeping oneÕs indiscretions hidden, or paying a fair price, for 
instance). Any value intrinsic to trust must adhere simply to XÕs having the 
trusting attitude; that is, in XÕs trusting Y, or just in XÕs trusting. That is to 
say, insofar as trust is intrinsically valued, it fundamental form must be, as 
one might say, attitudinal; it must be two-place, or even one-place but not 
three. It is then XÕs having a generalised disposition to trust in this way Ð to 
simply trust, or to trust Y Ð that explains why it is that X trusts Y to φ. 
Focussing, then, on attitudinal trust, what is this generalised 
disposition to trust? It is, I propose, the disposition to presume that oneÕs 
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interaction partner, the trustee in the Trust Game for instance, is 
trustworthy. This then raises the question of what it is to be trustworthy. 
Here Williams observes 
one thing it needs to be is the disposition of an agent to be reliable, not 
in the sense that you can rely on him to help you (that is a different 
disposition, helpfulness), but in the sense that he will help you if he 
has told you that he will help you or, perhaps, if he has led you to 
believe that he will (Williams 2002, 92). 
The answer I think is much closer to the one Williams rejects. His focus is 
wrongly on trust in its three-place or contractual form, and he understands 
the trustworthy disposition by reference to this form. But if it is the 
attitudinal form that the disposition of trustworthiness needs to be 
understood by reference to, then trustworthiness is much closer to 
helpfulness in that it is essentially a benevolent attitude, or an attitude of 
goodwill, that is manifest by an appropriate response to anotherÕs 
dependence. Appropriate in the sense of right: the trustworthy person can be 
relied on to do Ôthe right thingÕ. It is this benevolent attitude and associated 
goodwill that then allows for contract. 
That these attitudinal forms of trust and trustworthiness are 
fundamental can then be supported, I think, by five independent bits of 
evidence.11 
The first piece of evidence comes from everyday language. First, both 
the two-place predicate ÔX trusts YÕ and the three-place ÔX trusts Y to φÕ have 
unique and irreducible meanings. It is true that sometimes we use ÔX trusts YÕ 
as shorthand for ÔX trusts Y in some particular wayÕ; for instance, asked why 
she left her diary visible on the desk, X might reply that she trusts Y, and by 
this mean that she trusts Y not to read it. However, this is not the most 
straightforward use of ÔX trusts YÕ, which is that of a description of XÕs 
attitude towards Y as a trusting or trustful one.12 And by implication that Y, 
the object of XÕs attitude of trust, is someone who can be trusted. By contrast, 
ÔX trusts Y to φÕ is a metaphysically hybrid notion (like knowledge, as opposed 
to belief, is ordinarily understood) in that it describes an action Ð XÕs relying 
on Y to φ Ð and says of that action, that it is done with a certain attitude, 
which is best described as trustful. That is, it reports the fact of XÕs reliance 
and XÕs attitude to relying; it is not a direct description of XÕs attitude and 
does not carry the implication that Y is someone to be trusted. Now while ÔX 
trusts YÕ might imply a disposition to rely on Y in various ways, and one to 
rely on Y to φ, it cannot be reduced to such a disposition and formalised as 
Ô∀φ, X trusts Y to φÕ. For ÔX trusts YÕ might be true, while Ô∀φ, X trusts Y to φÕ 
                                                   
11
 For further argument see (Domenicucci and Holton 2016). 
12
 See (Becker 1996, 44-5). 
13 
will almost certainly be false: there is always a limit to what we will trust 
others to do. Moreover, this does not seem to be merely a quantification issue, 
since there is no restricted range of φ, R, for which Ô∀φѮR, X trusts Y to φÕ 
stands as an adequate formalism of ÔX trusts YÕ. For while it might be true that 
a complete lack of willingness to rely on Y would falsify the claim that ÔX 
trusts YÕ, there is no particular way in which X must rely on Y for this claim to 
be true. However, while ÔX trusts YÕ and ÔX trusts Y to φÕ are unique 
statements, there is some implication from the former to the latter but not 
vica versa. If X does trust Y, then there must be some φ for which X trusts Y to 
φ. But that X trusts Y to φ does not, in any way, imply that X trusts Y more 
generally, even if this would often also be true. Thus, of the two predicates, the 
two-place one is arguably more fundamental. 
Similar things may then be said when comparing the one-place 
predicate ÔX trustsÕ with the two-place predicate ÔX trusts YÕ. The former 
equally seems to have a place in everyday language: Òwe doÓ, Uslaner (2002, 22) 
observes, Òspeak of Ôtrusting peopleÕ generallyÓ. And this form does not seem 
reducible to Ô∀Y, X trusts YÕ for similar reasons. It will not be that X trusts 
everyone, and there is no determinate range of people that XÕs trust must 
range over. Rather, ÔX trustsÕ seems to make a different claim: that X has faith 
in people, in some Ògeneralised otherÓ, as Uslaner (2002, 24) says, not faith in 
any specific person or description. But again, while ÔX trustsÕ and ÔX trusts YÕ 
seem to be different and unique statements, there is some implication from 
the former to the latter but not vica versa. If X trusts, there must be some Y 
that X trusts, but that X trusts Y does not in any way imply that X trusts more 
generally. So of the two predicates, the one-place one is arguably more 
fundamental. Thus, the heart of our notion of trust seems to be simply an 
attitude of trust, which may, but need not, take specific persons as its object, 
and which can support, but need not, the act of relying on persons. 
The second and third bits of evidence come from considering trust in 
conjunction with distrust. ÒTo understand trustÓ, Katherine Hawley (2014, 1) 
says, Òwe must also understand distrust, yet distrust is usually treated as a 
mere afterthought, or mistakenly equated with an absence of trust.Ó The mere 
absence of trust might report nothing about oneÕs attitudes but rather stem 
from the fact that there is no cause for reliance. The car mechanic I trust 
when I donÕt seek a second quote, I donÕt trust to deliver my mail. However, 
my lack of trust here is its mere absence: I donÕt trust the mechanic in this 
regard not because I donÕt think him up to the job but because that is not his 
job. So I donÕt rely on him in this respect. Distrust, however, is not the mere 
absence of trust: it is an attitude in its own right, and one might expect as 
Hawley (2014, 4) proposes, there to be analytic connections between the 
attitudes of trust and distrust; such as, for instance, that if distrust is an 
appropriate attitude to take, then trust is not. However, that there are such 
analytic connections is hard to maintain if the fundamental notion of trust is 
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taken to be three-place or ÔX trusting Y to φÕ. Given that trust in this sense is 
metaphysically hybrid, any failure of trust can always be down to the failure 
of the action component. (My not trusting my mechanic to deliver my mail 
because I donÕt rely on him to do this.) But then trust could be inappropriate 
because of some inappropriateness in this action component; it would, for 
instance, be wrong to trust my mechanic to deliver my mail. However, this 
wrongness does not imply it is right to distrust my mechanic. So to keep the 
parallel between trust and distrust, the focus needs to be on the attitudinal 
conception of trust: trusting Y and distrusting Y. Moreover, this is implied by 
the fact that there is no three-place distrust predicate: we do not say ÔX 
distrusts Y to φÕ Ð I donÕt distrust my mechanic to deliver my mail! The 
absence of this predicate form then suggests that it is the two place ÔX trusts 
YÕ that is fundamental. 
Trust and distrust, it is often said, are contraries but not 
contradictories. 13  And this is true all the while trust is conceived 
contractually, or as three-place. In this case, a lack of trust need not imply 
distrust because there might be a lack of trust because there is a lack of 
reliance; there is no contract, as it were, or commitment as Hawley (2014, 10) 
would say. However, a lack of trust can imply distrust. Where trust is the 
background attitude Ð where it is two-place or one-place Ð if trust is lost what 
remains is not merely its lack but distrust. Suppose X trusts Y. This trust is 
manifest in XÕs disposition to rely on Y in various ways. And were X to report 
that he trusts Y, what X would thereby describe is an attitude towards Y that 
is a basic attitude that one can take towards a person, which involves making 
positive presumptions about their goodwill towards oneself. Remove these 
positive presumptions, so that it can no longer be taken for granted that Y will 
act in certain ways and will not act in others and what is left is distrust. For 
example, you might not seek a second quote simply because you trust your 
mechanic, and if so, you just presume the quote is honest; you might leave 
your diary lying on the desk simply because you trust your partner, and if so, 
so you just presume they wonÕt read it; or suppose you trust your partner, if so 
you will just presume they are not cheating on you; and so on. Remove trust 
in these cases, so you no longer presume the quote honest, the diary safe or 
your partner faithful and these situations are now ones of distrust.  
Relatedly, we tend not to trust people not to do things. For instance, you 
donÕt trust your partner not to have an affair, not because they canÕt be 
trusted in this but because such trust is peculiarly self-defeating. To trust 
them not to have an affair would be to draw their attention to the fact that 
you do not presume they will not, which amounts to not trusting them in this 
respect. Equally, your partner would not reassure you were they to say ÔdonÕt 
worry I wonÕt be unfaithfulÕ. This should be unspoken, part of what is 
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presumed by mutual trust. The same goes for one-place trust, in having a non-
directed attitude of trust we presume things about how people in general will 
behave towards us. For instance, we presume they wonÕt be unpromptedly 
aggressive. This presumption, Williams observes, can be sustained by 
reasoning Òin desperate circumstancesÓ, but in Òbetter timesÓ we just take it 
for granted. And it needs to be taken for granted because Ò[o]ne is not likely to 
be reassured by someone who says, ÔI promise not to murder youÕÓ (Williams 
2002, 89). Thus a proper account of the relation of trust to distrust, and the 
recognition that these can be contradictory, requires a purely attitudinal 
conception of trust. And it is then hard to see how it is not this attitude that 
is, as Williams (2002, 88) says, the basic form of trust Òon which all social 
interaction dependsÓ. 
The fourth piece of evidence concerns the relationship between trust 
and trustworthiness. The attitude of trust is, in part, identified by its relation 
to the thought that the trusted is trustworthy. Reassurance comes from this 
thought. However, this connection between trust and trustworthiness is 
broken if trust is conceived contractually, or as three-place. Under this 
conception, say in a case where X trusts Y to φ, the thought that Y is 
trustworthy is, at least, that Y will reliably φ. However, it might be that this is 
not the trustworthy thing to do and, indeed, can be quite the opposite. This 
might be illustrated by a case where the trusting party is in error. Imagine a 
hot parched land and X arriving thirsty at YÕs homestead. He asks Y for water 
from the well that stands in front on YÕs house, and Y responds by telling him 
that he canÕt have that water and then goes inside. In fact Y has gone to fetch 
X some clean water from the tank at the back of the house, the water in the 
well standing at front of the house having been poisoned by livestock that fell 
into it and died at the start of Spring. Not knowing this, X will judge Y 
untrustworthy, and if trustworthiness is identified by reference to trust Y 
would be so. But of course, YÕs response is the right and trustworthy one. This 
point is made and developed by Knud Ejler L¿gstrup in his discussion of trust.  
The other personÕs interpretation of the implication of the trust 
offered [that is, the trusting party YÕs interpretation] É is one thing, 
and the demand which is implicit in that trust É which I must 
interpret is quite another thing (L¿gstrup 1997, 21). 
Responding to trust cannot be Òmerely a matter of fulfilling the other personÕs 
expectations and granting his or her wishesÓ (L¿gstrup 1997, 21). This is 
because, in the trust situation, such as that of the poisoned well, Òwhat we are 
speaking of is a demand for love, not for indulgenceÓ (L¿gstrup 1997, 21). Thus 
the demand on the trusted Ð what L¿gstrup calls the radical ethical demand 
and might be called the demand that X be trustworthy Ð is generated by the 
fact of the trusting partyÕs dependence.14 It is not generated by XÕs attitudes Ð 
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that is, by his trust. But this is to say that trustworthiness cannot be defined 
with respect to trust if trust is conceived contractually, or as three-place. The 
analytical connection between trust and trustworthiness is preserved if trust 
is taken to be merely an attitude, or as two-place. For suppose, in the poisoned 
well case, that X simply trusts Y. In trusting Y, X will think that Y is 
trustworthy. And in thinking this, X will not place any specific expectation on 
Y, but will rather just expect it of Y that Y does the right or trustworthy thing. 
Connected to this point is Katherine HawleyÕs observation that trust 
can be unwanted. In this regard she gives the example of trusting her 
colleagues to buy her champagne, in a situation where, for whatever reason, 
she is to be honoured. Now it might be that her colleagues plan to buy her 
champagne but, Hawley (2014, 7) observes, Ò[s]till, they do not invite or 
welcome my trust in this respect; instead, they want to give me a treat, not 
merely to act as trustworthiness requires, and certainly not to risk betraying 
me if they forget to buy the champagneÓ. This observation is good, but her 
trust is unwanted, in part, I suggest, because it implies the falsehood that the 
colleagues would be untrustworthy if they did not supply it. This is false 
precisely because being trustworthy is not a matter of wish fulfilment. It is a 
matter of doing the appropriate thing, which might still be to buy champagne, 
and HawleyÕs colleagues want to be trusted to do this. So to trust them is to 
trust in the two-place sense, and such trust would not be unwanted. What is 
objectionable is the implicit contract, not the background attitude. 
The fifth and final piece of evidence for the priority of two-place over 
three-place trust comes from a consideration of infant trust. Any account of 
trust, Annette Baier (1986, 244) proposes, should accommodate infant trust. 
And this generates the constraint Òthat it not make essential to trusting the 
use of concepts or abilities which a child cannot be reasonably believed to 
possessÓ. Suppose now that X trusts Y to φ. In trusting Y to φ, X will take an 
optimistic view of Y and her motivations; and in so taking this view X will, at 
the very least, presume that Y will φ, and φ because X manifestly depends on 
her doing so. To do what X trusts for this reason would be to be trustworthy. 
So in trusting Y to φ, X presumes that Y is trustworthy (or at the very least X 
presumes this: often, if not ordinarily, this presumption will be an item of 
knowledge or firm belief). Thus XÕs trusting Y to φ involves a complex of 
reasoning. It involves imagining the trust situation from YÕs perspective, 
imagining YÕs recognition of XÕs dependence, and imagining Y seeing this as a 
reason to do what X depends on Y doing. Now it is arguable that this kind of 
second personal reasoning is both prosaic and fundamental to moral 
thought.15 However, it is not the kind of reasoning that an infant could engage 
in. By contrast, suppose that X trusts Y; for instance, an infant X trusts his 
mother Y. In trusting his mother, X will have the thought that she is 
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trustworthy and, at the very least, presume this thought to be true. But this 
thought need not be articulated in these terms, and its possession involves no 
second-personal awareness; it is merely the thought that his mother will do 
the right thing, had in a context of dependence. And even this thought need 
not be articulated: it amounts to no more than confidence or faith in his 
motherÕs actions. This does seem to be the kind of thought that an infant 
could have. Suppose then that BaierÕs constraint on accounts of trust is 
plausible. What this implies is either than an account of trust must satisfy her 
constraint, or acknowledge that two-place trust is a more basic form than 
three-place. 
 
7.!   
Where does this leave the problem of trust? This problem, I argued in section 
two, is confronted when three facts hold true of a situation where one might 
rely on someone: (i) reliance has a worst case outcome Ð one relies and other 
proves unreliable; (ii) both parties know the interaction to be one-off, or of a 
determinate number; and (iii) one is entirely ignorant of the other partyÕs 
motivations, but know there is some general reason to be unreliable. An 
internal solution to this problem is then one that explains how it is that 
reliance is rational in such situations with a worst case outcome even when 
(ii) and (iii) hold. An internal solution is what is philosophically wanted 
because we do rely in these circumstances, and any other solution would fail 
to make sense of the rationality of doing so. Both Gauthier and Pettit advance 
internal solutions, which for the reasons discussed, I think fail. And this 
paper advances an internal solution, which might be called the trust-based 
solution. According to this solution, the problem of trust is insinuated by the 
background assumption that it is the subjectÕs beliefs and desires Ð their 
preferences Ð that explain action; and that rational action is a matter of 
maximizing preference satisfaction. This insinuates the problem because it 
excludes the reason that can, and often does, motivate reliance, which is 
simply the attitude of trust. Thus, with respect to the Trust Game, and the 
question of why rely on the trustee when (ii) and (iii) hold, the answer can be 
just that the investor is trusting. And this answer can be not merely a 
description of the investorÕs psychological disposition; it can also capture the 
investorÕs reasons. 
This raises the question of how it is that a trusting attitude can 
rationalize reliance. And this question is, in fact, two: how does a trusting 
attitude rationalize reliance? And, why does a trusting attitude rationalize 
reliance? With respect to how, the answer is via what is involved in thinking 
well of others, which is what having a trusting attitude amounts to. Suppose 
that X is trusting (one-place) or specifically trusts Y (two-place). If this is true, 
then in a case where X has a choice of relying on Y, X will presume that Y will 
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do the right or trustworthy thing. In the Trust Game, this presumption would 
be that trustee will return a fair share of the money gained. Making this 
presumption is constitutive of having a trusting attitude: it taking this 
attitude one thinks well of others, and this presumption articulates this 
thought in a context of potential reliance. Thus the presumption is not based 
on any evidence of YÕs reliability, and, as such, it would be available even if X 
knew nothing about YÕs particular motivations. It would be available that is, 
in a situation where (i), (ii) and (iii) hold true. However, the question is then 
whether this presumption is available to the investor in the Trust Game when 
the investor knows that there is some general reason for the trustee to be 
unreliable. The answer, I think, is that it is a feature of trust that it has a 
certain resilience to doubt. Were X to possess knowledge of YÕs particular 
motivations to the effect that YÕs preference was always for profit, trust would 
become hard (though I conjecture, it might still be possible to give Y the 
benefit of the doubt). However, in the absence of any such particular grounds 
for worry, the nature of trust as an optimistic attitude, involves giving no 
credit to a mere general worry.16 It follows that the presumption that Y will do 
the right or trustworthy thing would be available, and that, as a consequence, 
it would be rational for X to make the transfer. If XÕs attitude is trusting Ð if X 
trusts (one-place) or trusts Y (two place) Ð then it is rational for X to rely on Y 
in certain respects. In particular, if XÕs attitude is trusting, it is rational for X 
to rely on Y to make a back transfer, even where (ii) and (iii) hold true. 
Why, then, does a trusting attitude rationalize reliance? The short 
answer: because trusting and being trustworthy are actions that we 
intrinsically value; and in valuing behaviours that are so described we think 
that, other things being equal, we have a reason to act in these ways, and 
acting in these ways is the right thing to do. Moreover, valuing these 
behaviours cannot be translated into a statement about our preferences, even 
if it might imply such; value is not, as Gauthier (1986, 49) says, merely Òa 
measure of individual preferenceÓ. The solution to the problem of trust is not 
this: change the preference ordering by adding a desire to be trusting and 
trustworthy. The preference ordering is rather kept as described: the 
problematic cases of reliance are ones where (i) holds true; they are cases with 
a worst outcome, which is that one relies and the other proves unreliable. 
These are cases were some reassurance would seem to be needed. Thus the 
solution is not to change these cases by adding such a desire to be trusting 
that what was the worst outcome ceases to be so. Rather, in intrinsically 
valuing trusting and trustworthy behaviours, we recognise reasons for acting 
in these ways that are not reducible to our preferences for so acting. Thus, in 
intrinsically valuing these behaviours, we think that rational deliberation in a 
potential reliance situation should start from the presumption that the other 
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party will behave trustworthily.17 And, when trusted, we think that rational 
deliberation should start from the fact of the trusting partyÕs need. We then 
explain and justify our own and othersÕ behaviour by reference to these 
prescriptions. Thus the claim about intrinsic value can be understood as a 
claim, as Williams says, about how these actions and their accompanying 
attitudes make sense to us from the inside. 
Moreover, deliberating as the trusting and trustworthy person cannot 
be captured in terms of a preference for following a norm Ð the norm, for 
instance, of trusting, or presuming that the other party is trustworthy. This is 
because deliberating in these ways involves seeing the potential reliance 
situation in a certain light, where this perceptual metaphor highlights the 
immediacy of the normative judgement. Take the Trust Game. The right, or 
trustworthy, way of viewing an investorÕs transfer is as being a reason to make 
a back-transfer, and this is how a trustworthy trustee would see it. Then in 
presuming that the trustee is trustworthy, the trusting investor would 
likewise see the situation generated by their transfer as one wherein the 
trustee has this reason. That is, the perception of this situation will contain 
within it a judgment about what ought to be done and, correlatively, about 
how action is to be explained.18 There is no inference from the thought that 
some norm applies in this case conjoined with the desire to follow this norm; 
and to suppose that there is would be to miss the immediacy of what is 
essentially a non-inferential judgement. 
In conclusion, let me make three observations about this trust-based 
solution. First, the claim is not that a preference-based explanation of action 
generally fails; on the contrary, this form of explanation is good in very many 
cases. Moreover, it can be the best way of predicting behaviour in a potential 
reliance situation. The trustee in the Trust Game might be GauthierÕs 
straightforward maximiser. Now trust tends to exclude doubt.19 So if oneÕs 
attitude is trusting, then, other things being equal, one will put aside the 
worry that another is not similarly motivated Ð if this worry occurs at all. 
However, other things might not be equal: one might have concrete grounds 
for doubt. And if this were so, the only way to render reliance rational would 
be to support it with a belief about outcome. At this point, a calculation of 
preference would be needed, since an attitude of trust could not rationalize 
reliance give sufficient evidence that it is not mutual. However, what makes 
this normative claim true, ordinarily, is that given such evidence, the attitude 
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of trust would no longer be available.20 It would be replaced by an attitude of 
distrust. What our intrinsically valuing trust and trustworthiness then 
explains is why distrust is not so pervasive. 
Second, the philosophical justification of our valuing trust and 
trustworthiness, which is WilliamsÕs genealogical argument, is not what  
Korsgaard (1986, 22) calls an Ôultimate justificationÕ; that is, it does not 
purport to show that Òall rational persons could be brought to see that they 
have a reason to act in the way requiredÓ, which, in this case, is to act as the 
trusting or trustworthy person does. If GauthierÕs or PettitÕs justification of 
reliance Ð ÔtrustingÕ as they say Ð were successful, then such an ultimate 
justification would be available. But a significant burden of this paper has 
been to support WilliamsÕs contention that the problem of trust is endemic to 
this conception of reason. What the solution argued for here involves is an 
expansion of the scope of what counts as a reason for acting. Korsgaard, of 
course, argues for such an expansion in the hope of ultimately justifying 
moral principles. It would take more time to argue this point but the problem 
this strategy confronts, at least in application to the present case, is that it 
must regard strategic reasoning as a failure of rationality. But there seems no 
rational deficiency in reasoning in a tit-for-tat manner. 
Third, the ÔmoralityÕ of trust is thus a veneer in the sense that we need 
not have achieved this way of looking at things, and this way of looking at 
things could easily break down. In WilliamsÕs terms, we are lucky to live in 
Òbetter timesÓ Williams (2002), p.89.21 However, this is not to make intrinsic 
value purely a matter of our valuing: our having this set of values is further 
valuable in the sense that it would be a bad thing if we saw the world 
otherwise. These are better times. In this respect, the shift in how the trust 
situation is conceived that is involved in having a trusting attitude is not 
merely a matter of having a certain upbringing, it is a matter of having a good 
upbringing. It is just that this notion of goodness cannot be worked into 
correctness since there could be other ways of securing the motivations 
needed to render trust non-problematic.2223 
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